China and India are set to begin joint military exercises in October, just another example of the two nations growing bilateral relations. The decision to begin military exchanges and cooperation has focused on two areas: counterterrorism and joint military exercises.
In June we reported on India Army Chief of Staff General Joginder Jaswant Sigh’s visit to China and the subsequent announcement that China and India would hold the first ever joint army exercises between the two nations. Both countries hope that the joint exercises will strengthen Sino-Indian defense ties and build up confidence within each another.
Jagannath Panda comments in a report for The Jamestown Foundation’s China Brief, that China has increasingly relied on its military diplomacy to advance its strategic ambitions overseas. Indeed, China’s military is a very active ambassador for the country abroad, supplying arms and training across the developing world. In India, the Chinese have looked to overcome a historical mistrust by increasing the breadth of the exchanges, as Panda’s report states:
Perhaps, the significance of these exchanges is their unprecedented nature; not even in the prime days of the “bhai-bhai” Sino-Indian relations did this type of relationship exist. It seems that the proposed “joint military operations” are intended to bridge the communications gap between the two militaries. Both armies are in favor of inviting observers to their exercises, which suggests a “degree of comfort” with each other more than anything else.
The current proposal for counterterrorism exercises, however, should be considered as an important development from the Chinese perspective on two accounts: first, China’s own concerns regarding separatist activities in Xinjiang and Tibet, and second, China’s counterterrorism preparations before the 2008 Olympics. Given these considerations, Chinese authorities have expressed an interest in learning from the Indian military’s tactics and methods in countering the insurgency in Kashmir. Concurrently, India appears eager to improve its counterterrorism capabilities for its 2010 Commonwealth games by gleaning lessons from China’s 2008 Olympics security preparations.
Panda goes on to comment on the impact the exercises will have, stating that it is unlikely that they will have much of an impact in the short term. “The exercises are unlikely to bring about actual confidence at the bilateral level” he writes, attributing China’s ambivalent stance on the issue of cross-border terrorism in Kashmir as the reason.
Beijing’s equivocal stance on the issue of “cross-border terrorism” in Kashmir raises questions about its credibility and intentions as a counterterrorism partner of India.
China’s sales of arms to Pakistan, the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal as well as the changing South Asia strategic landscape means that China and India will proceed cautiously in building a strategic military relationship. The two nations still have much to overcome – boundary disputes continue to this day, the recent Arunachal Pradesh issue being just one example – and, as Panda writes, military ties can be expected to remain tenuous in the coming years.
